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PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
P. Raymond Lamonica*
EXCLUSIONARY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Miranda
The United States Supreme Court continued' last term's rejection
of expansive Miranda exclusionary sanctions. Insofar as the practical
impact upon the interrogations process is concerned, Oregon v. Elstad2
may be the most significant interpretation of Miranda yet. The issue
presented was the effect of an initial failure to provide Miranda warnings
on a subsequent statement made after the warnings were given. The
practical question presented is under what circumstances can law en-
forcement officers commence custodial interrogation without Miranda
warnings, obtain a statement, give Miranda warnings, and then obtain
a statement to be used in evidence. The question often has been resolved
at the trial and appellate court levels by deciding whether the first
statement, obtained in violation of Miranda, "taints ' 3 the second state-
ment, with the government having the burden of proving the absence
of taint. Elstad appears to reject this approach.
The facts are necessary to appreciate the scope of the holding, as
well as to gain insight into the majority's continuing4 approach of finding
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (public safety exception);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984) (inapplicability of Miranda to forcible
stops), discussed in Lamonica, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Pre-Trial Criminal
Procedure, 45 La. L. Rev. 501, 518 (1984).
2. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985)
3. See discussion, id. at 1289-90; see also cases cited, id. at 1294 n.2. The "fruit
of the poisonous trees" and "cat out of the bag" metaphors provide little analytical
guidance and are not used here.
4. In New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984), the Court was willing to find
interrogation and Miranda application under circumstances where a contrary decision would
have been reasonable. Compare State v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 220 (La. 1974). In Elstad, the
Court appeared eager to find custody and'thus Miranda application, although again,
under the circumstances, a finding of lack of custody under Miranda would have been
reasonable. Compare Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969). That the
state "conceded the issue of custody," of course, should not control the legal question.
105 S. Ct. at 1297.
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Miranda applicable while refusing to afford an exclusionary sanction.
With an arrest warrant, officers arrived at the eighteen-year-old
Elstad's home to arrest him for participating in the burglary of a
neighbor's residence. Elstad's mother answered the door and led the
officers to her son's bedroom. Upon dressing, Elstad accompanied one
officer to the living room, and another officer asked the mother to
accompany him into the kitchen so that he could explain that they had
a warrant for her son's arrest. The other officer then sat down with
Elstad in the living room, asked him if he knew why they were there
("no"), if he knew a named suspect ("yes"), and if he had heard of
the burglary ("yes"). The officer then told Elstad that he felt he was
involved in the burglary. Elstad looked at the officer and stated, "Yes,
I was there." 5 About one hour later, at the sheriff's office, Miranda
warnings were given and Elstad gave a statement which was "typed,
reviewed, . . . [and] signed by Elstad and both officers." '6 Subsequently
Elstad added to the incriminating statement. Elstad conceded that no
threats or promises were made at his house or at the sheriff's office. 7
The trial court found that "[the] written statement was given freely,
voluntarily and knowingly . . . [and] was not tainted in any way by the
previous brief statement." ' The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding, "[R]egardless of the absence of actual compulsion, the coer-
cive impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because
in a defendant's mind it has sealed his fate .... [Tihis impact . . . must
be dissipated in order to make a subsequent confession admissible. ' 9
After the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, "to consider ... whether the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression
of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver
of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary
but unwarned admission from the defendant."' 0
The questions addressed by the Court go beyond the issue presented.
Justice O'Connor did not limit the discussion to whether failure to give
initial Miranda warnings, alone, requires exclusion of a subsequent state-
ment. In going beyond that narrow question, ambiguity is created as
to the opinion's scope and significance. Justice O'Connor concluded:
A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect
who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily
5. 105 S. Ct. at 1289.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1290.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission
of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of
fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational
and intelligent choice whether to waiver or invoke his rights."
This rationale clearly eliminates a presumption that the subsequent
statement after subsequent Miranda warnings and waiver is involuntary.
It further, however, might be construed to create a presumption that
the statement is voluntary under such circumstances. That this may be
Justice O'Connor's intention is reflected by her conclusion that the
Court "has never held that the psychological impact of voluntary dis-
closure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises
the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver."' 2 Yet, at the con-
clusion of the opinion the stated holding is much narrower: "We hold
today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive
questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing
after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings."' 3
One reason for the confusion is that the opinion is unclear as to
whether it is dealing with a standard of review for appellate courts to
employ in reviewing the mixed question of law and fact found by trial
courts or whether it is establishing a legal standard for determining
voluntariness for both the trial and reviewing courts. Such a distinction
is critical. It is one thing to say when an appellate court reviews the
findings of a trial court (as in Elstad), the finder of fact may reasonably
conclude that the suspect "waived his rights" and reasonably defer to
the judgment of the original fact finder. It is a wholly different matter
to establish a legal standard for the fact finder that "[a] subsequent
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a vol-
untary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the
conditions [Miranda violations] that precluded admission of the earlier
statement.' ' 4 This effectively creates a presumption that noncoercive
Miranda violations have no effect on the subsequent statement's vol-
untariness, absent some exceptional circumstance shown by the defend-
ant.
Recognizing that "[tihe relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the
second statement was also voluntarily made"'" and the lack of a need
for "imputing"' ' 6 effect, one need not necessarily conclude that Elstad
creates a new legal standard with respect to voluntariness. Rather, it
11. Id. at 1296 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 1295 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 1296.
15. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
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merely limits Miranda's exclusionary sanction by eliminating a pre-
sumption that a violation of Miranda affects subsequent voluntariness.
The decision may be further limited if the quoted statement about the
subsequent warning's ordinary effect sets forth a standard that the
appellate court should employ in reviewing the trial courts finding in
the difficult mixed question of law and fact involved in determining
voluntariness.
Recalling the historical context in which the Elstad issue arises is
helpful to evaluate the exclusionary policy analysis. Under the fourth
amendment, confessions are excluded due to existing exclusionary policy
predicated primarily upon deterring improper police conduct. 7 As a
result, a voluntary statement, as well as the more trustworthy physical
evidence, may be excluded. Voluntariness is only an incidental, not a
primary, concern in a fourth amendment exclusionary policy analysis.
Direct fifth amendment violations traditionally 8 have been addressed
in terms of whether the statement, including a subsequent statement,
was voluntary. If a statement is voluntary it is admissible. Deterring
improper police conduct is only an incidental concern. Thus, it does
not automatically follow that violations of Miranda's prophylactic rules
(which go beyond voluntariness) require an exclusionary policy designed
primarily to deter improper police conduct, i.e., the fourth amendment
approach.
When a fourth amendment violation and a Miranda violation are com-
bined, the distinct purposes of two exclusionary policies are highlighted. For
example, assume an unconstitutional arrest takes place followed immediately
by a statement without Miranda warnings and a subsequent statement ob-
tained after Miranda warnings. The first statement is inadmissible under both
the fourth amendment and Miranda. The second statement might be admis-
sible under the fourth amendment if the state proves the defendant's state-
ment was "sufficiently an act of free will [such that] the primary taint [was
purged]."' 9 Making this determination "requires not merely that the state-
ment meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness." 0 "Even if the
statements were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth
17. After United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), it is clear that the deterrence
rationale is the primary if not sole basis for the exclusionary rule. See discussion in
Lamonica, supra note 1.
18. Louisiana has had long experience with this issue. See, e.g., State v. Hash, 12
La. Ann. 895 (1857); State v. Stuart, 35 La. Ann. 1015 (1883); State v. Phelps, 138 La.
11, 69 So. 856 (1915); and in a more modern context State v. Thornton, 351 So. 2d 480
(La. 1977).
19. Under the Court's rationale the statement will be tainted and the prosecution
will have to introduce evidence which proves that the statement was an "act of free will."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416-17 (1963).
20. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1975).
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Amendment issue remains."'" Voluntariness does not control because
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule has as its purpose to deter
lawless conduct and to "[close] the doors of . . . courts to any use of
evidence unconstitutionally obtained. ' 22 The fifth amendment's exclu-
sionary policy antedates that of the fourth amendment, and is predicated
primarily upon voluntariness and trustworthiness. 2 The burden of prov-
ing voluntariness and the waiver of Miranda rights still remains on the
state.2 4 A prior voluntary statement given in violation of Miranda is a
significant fact in making such a determination, but fourth amendment
exclusionary policy may not be completely applicable to the fifth amend-
ment issue, much less to the violation of one of Miranda's prophylactic
rules. While there is language supporting contrary views,25 the Elstad
majority apparently is relying upon traditional voluntariness, exclusionary
policy concerns. An additional voluntariness factor recognized is a refusal
to allow a factual or legal assumption with respect to the psychological
impact of the first Miranda-violated statement: "The relevant inquiry
is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made. As
in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the surrounding
circumstances and the entire course of police conduct, with respect to
the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. '26
If Miranda is to be maintained as an efficient and realistic way of
dealing with the more difficult voluntariness issue, Elstad's impact must
be carefully considered. A central purpose of Miranda was to provide
a simpler yet reasonably realistic determination of voluntariness in most
custodial interrogations. When Miranda is violated the voluntariness
determination may be more difficult. Elstad does not undercut Miranda's
purpose if finders of fact, with the assistance of adversary counsel,
realistically evaluate whether the subsequent statement came after a
knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda and was voluntary. While
there is no need to presume the first, unwarned statement was com-
pulsive, there is also no need to presume that it was not. As with any
complex mixed question of law and fact, realistic fact-finding on a case-
by-case basis is imperative.
Significantly, the Court did not address the effect of Miranda vi-
olations when a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or his right
21. Id. at 601-02, 95 S. Ct. at 2261.
22. Id. at 599, 95 S. Ct. at 2259, quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 486, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963).
23. See, e.g., State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1977).
24. See, e.g., La. R.S. 15:451, 452 (1981).
25. See Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299 (Brenan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor char-
acterized Justice Brennan's dissent in "apocalyptic tone . . . distort[ing] the reasoning and
holding . . . [and] worse, invitling] trial courts and prosecutors to do the same." 105 S.
Ct. at 1298 n.5.
26. 105 S. Ct. at 1298 (emphasis added).
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to counsel. In such circumstances, particularly with respect to requests
for counsel, there may be a greater need for a more expansive exclu-
sionary policy to assure compliance with the demands. Those issues
however cannot properly be resolved by automatic or mechanical ap-
plication of an exclusionary sanction. Similarly, the proper resolution
may require more than the voluntariness concerns expressed in Elstad.
In light of article I, section 1327 which elevates Miranda-type rights
to constitutional protections in Louisiana and in light of the Louisiana
Supreme Court's treatment of these protections as an integral part of
voluntariness, the impact of Elstad is less clear. In State v. Callihan,8
Justice Dixon, speaking for the court, apparently created a per se re-
quirement of giving Miranda warnings for establishing voluntariness:
"One of those legal requirements [of voluntariness] is that defendant
be given the 'Miranda' warnings before custodial interrogation begins." 2 9
If this position is maintained, then the first statement, unlike that
in Elstad, will be treated as involuntary as a matter of law, and then
traditional voluntariness analysis would be appropriate.
Searches Upon Less Than Probable Cause
New Jersey v. T.L.O.30 provides another example of the Court
adopting a restrictive exclusionary policy under the fourth amendment.
The Court granted certiorari "to examine the appropriateness of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of
the Fourth Amendment by public school authorities."3 Since the Court
concluded that no fourth amendment violation took place, that issue
was not reached. Rather, the Court articulated "the proper standard
for assessing the . . .[constitutionality] of searches conducted by public
school officials." 32 The opinion may be of broader significance, however,
because its rationale allows an extensive evidentiary search upon less
than probable cause that a crime had been or was being committed.
The Court concluded that the fourth amendment unreasonable search
and seizure prohibition applies to searches conducted by public school
27. La. Const. art. I, § 13 provides:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the inves-
tigaton or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason
for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self
incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right
to court appointed counsel.
28. 320 So. 2d 155 (La. 1975).
29. Id. at 158. See discussion, Lamonica, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 La. L. Rev. 535, 544
(1977).
30. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
31. Id. at 736.
32. Id.
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officials, but that "'probable cause' is not an irreducible requirement
of a valid search," 33 and that "the warrant ... is unsuited to the school
environment." '3 4 Rather, the Court adopted the balancing approach first
articulated in Terry v. Ohio.3" "Where a careful balancing of government
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by
a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
3 6
T.L.O. involved the search of a purse of a student suspected of
violating the school's rule against smoking in a lavatory. Upon a thor-
ough search, cigarettes and marijuana were found. Prior to the search,
there was no reason to believe that a crime had taken place and pos-
sessing cigarettes did not violate school rules. The Court concluded,
"[tihe initial decision to open the purse was justified by . . . [the] well-
founded suspicion that T.L.O. had violated the rule forbidding smoking
in the lavatory." '3 7 The marijuana was discovered "in plain view" 38 and
justified' a more thorough search.
Significantly, the Court determined that ordinarily "a search of a
student by a teacher or other school official will be, 'justified at its
inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school."3 9
The Court recognized that it was not deciding "whether a schoolchild
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school
property provided for the storage of school supplies," ' 40 whether there
is a different standard authorizing searches when made in conjunction
with or at the request of law enforcement agencies4' or "whether in-
dividualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness stand-
ard adopt[ed], ' 42 thus barring general searches of students or places
where they store property.
The United States Supreme Court noted that the Louisiana Supreme
Court had held "that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school
searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable
33. Id. at 743.
34. Id.
35. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
36. 105 S. Ct. at 743.
37. Id. at 737.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 741 n.5.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 744.
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cause is unreasonable. ' 43 Since State v. Mora appears predicated in part
on the state constitution, it, of course, is not clear what impact T.L.O.
will have on it. The legislature has authorized school searches for enum-
erated contraband as well as "other materials or objects the possession
of which is a violation of" 44 school board policy. The statute, however,
requires the teacher, principal, or administrator to have "articulable
facts which lead him to a reasonable belief that the items sought will
be found. '45 This language appears to conform to the principles of
T.L.O. which are founded upon Terry. Because the statute provides that
it shall not "be construed to afford a student an expectation of privacy
which would not otherwise exist, ' 46 it does not appear to provide pro-
tections beyond those enumerated in the constitution.
Good Faith Exception in Louisiana
Two Louisiana courts of appeal have now accepted the United States
v. Leon exclusionary rule exception. In State v. DiMaggio4 1 a fifth
circuit panel found the views expressed in Leon "refreshing ' 48 and
applied them without considering whether the Louisiana Constitution
requires a different exclusionary policy. In State v. Wood, 49 Judge Hall,
writing for a second circuit panel concluded:
There is no good reason why this state should not now apply
the exception to or limitation of the exclusionary rule established
by the United States Supreme Court in Leon .... It advances
the legitimate interests of the criminal justice system without
sacrificing the individual rights guaranteed by the constitution. 0
Both courts examined the probable cause question carefully, rather
than assuming arguendo its absence, and found no probable cause in
the warrants. Commendably, this approach furthers the appellate courts'
role in providing guidance to lower courts and law enforcement personnel
and thus avoids the significant criticism of the good faith exception
that the reviewing courts' guidance, as well as the fourth amendment's
further development, will be frozen."
43. 105 S. Ct. 738-39 n.2, citing State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated,
423 U.S. 809, 96 S. Ct. 20 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
44. La. R.S. 17:416.3(A) (Supp. 1985).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 461 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 443.
49. 457 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 210.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3423 (1984).
[Vol. 46
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By carefully addressing the issuing authority's actions and finding
them substandard, guidance continues to be provided to the issuing
authority. Neither court, however, expressly addressed or emphasized
that Leon creates a standard for review, not a standard for the issuing
magistrate.12
State v. Taylor 3 presents an interesting related matter. The issue
was the application of the "good faith" exception to an arrest made
on a recalled warrant, incorrectly communicated to arresting officers.
The court cites with approval authorities reaching the broader conclusion
that if there is an invalid warrant communicated, the good faith exception
does not apply.14 The holding is narrow, however, because the second
circuit imputed knowledge of the fact that the warrant was recalled to
the police because "of the information on file in its records depart-
ment." 55 Furthermore, the court imputed this knowledge to "all suc-
cessive officers who deal with the defendant. 6
The court was not required to decide the effect of the good faith
exception on a communicated warrant where it is not factually appro-
priate to impute knowledge. Previously this problem was addressed in
terms of the absence of probable cause. Since Leon no longer requires
exclusion based upon the mere absence of probable cause in warrant
cases, further consideration appears appropriate. It will be necessary to
decide whether this type situation is to be considered a warrant or
nonwarrant case. In deciding that difficult issue, the concern should be
whether an exclusionary sanction is necessary to ensure that information
is carefully disseminated over the highly sophisticated communication
networks. In light of the scope and impersonal nature of such com-
munications and the difficulties in assuring accountability, greater con-
cern may be appropriate.
Taylor also highlights the dilemma courts may increasingly find in
light of limited views of exclusionary policy. Judge Norris admonished,
"[w]e share the lower court's consternation at the reprehensible and
uncalled for acts of these sophisticated and highly trained officers.
Blatant warrantless searches and fraudulent affidavits cannot be tolerated
even though in rare instances, as here, they fall short of actually violating
the rights of an accused." '5 7 If public admonition proves ineffective,
other controls, including administrative or supervisory sanctions, may
prove necessary.
52. See discussion, Lamonica, supra note 1, at 504.
53. 468 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 624-25.
55. Id. at 625.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 632.

